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Do We Now Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income? 
 




      The tax treatment of capital income is one of the most contentious aspects of existing 
tax systems, both in theory and in practice.  Most existing income taxes strongly reflect 
the structure recommended by Haig (1921) and Simons (1938), who advocated that 
individuals be taxed on their combined wage and capital income, subject to a perhaps 
progressive rate structure.
1  The Haig-Simons structure came to be known as a 
Comprehensive Income Tax.  Yet in most countries, an increasing fraction of revenue 
over time has been collected through value-added taxes and payroll taxes, both of which 
exempt capital income from tax.  In recent years, several Scandinavian countries have 
also moved away from equal tax rates on wage and capital income by maintaining a 
progressive tax on wage income but imposing a flat tax at a relatively low rate on a 
particular definition of capital income.  Even under tax systems that maintain the 
structure of a Comprehensive Income Tax, a growing fraction of savings has been in 
pension plans, IRA’s, and equivalents, that in theory do not distort savings incentives.  
Most countries also exempt income in kind from owner-occupied housing and consumer 
durables.  Together, owner-occupied housing and pensions comprise a large fraction of 
household savings.   
      While existing income taxes still maintain many elements of a Comprehensive 
Income Tax, there have been many tax reform proposals that would exempt income from 
capital.  Examples include the Meade Committee Report (1978), Bradford (1984), Hall 
and Rabushka (1995), McLure and Zodrow (1996), presidential candidate Steve Forbes’ 
flat tax proposal, and Bond, et. al. (1996).   
       The theoretical literature in this area has largely focused on measuring the many 
types of efficiency costs that arise from the current tax treatment of capital income.  
Existing taxes, for example, distort overall investment incentives, the allocation of capital 
                                                           
1 The tax reform recommendations of the U.S. Treasury (1984), a modified version of which was enacted in 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, would have moved the U.S. tax much closer to a Comprehensive Income Tax.     2
across sectors and countries, corporate debt-equity ratios, overall savings incentives, 
portfolio choice, realization patterns for capital gains, etc.  Each of these types of 
distortions appears to create nontrivial efficiency losses.  In combination, the efficiency 
losses would appear to be a major consideration in the design of the tax structure. 
      Of course, efficiency costs are only one consideration when choosing tax rates.   In 
spite of these high efficiency costs, taxes on capital income could still perhaps be 
justified if they generate sufficient offsetting distributional gains per dollar of tax revenue 
raised.  At the optimal policy, the efficiency costs net of distributional gains from taxes 
on capital income, per dollar of resulting tax revenue, should equal the net costs/gains 
from other sources of revenue.   
      In an earlier paper (Gordon and Slemrod (1988)), we looked at these issues more 
closely.   To begin with, using U.S. tax return data from 1983, we estimated how much 
tax revenue would change if the tax system were modified to exempt income from capital 
in present value, while leaving tax rates and tax incentives otherwise unchanged.  
Surprisingly, we found that the existing tax system in that year collected effectively 
nothing in revenue from taxes on capital income.  Of course, distributional gains might 
still be sufficient to justify such taxes, even if they do not collect revenue on net.  This 
paper then looked at the distributional effects of taxing capital income, and found that 
these distributional effects were largely perverse.  Lower income taxpayers, who largely 
invested in taxable bonds, had lower after-tax income under the existing tax structure.  In 
contrast, higher income taxpayers gained.  In particular, personal and corporate interest 
deductions saved higher income taxpayers enough in taxes to offset any other taxes due 
on their capital income.  
      This past study has several key weaknesses, though, as a guide for current policy 
discussions.  For one, it examines data from before the 2001, 1993, and particularly the 
1986, tax reforms which included major changes in the tax treatment of capital.
2  In 
addition, the data for the previous study came from 1983, which was at the tail end of a 
                                                           
2 For example, the 1986 tax reform made it harder to make use of interest deductions, by allowing only 
home mortgage interest deductions on Schedule A and by preventing real estate losses from being 
deductible on Schedule E.  Depreciation schedules were also lengthened, while capital gains were taxed 
more heavily.      3
deep recession.  Results might have been different at other points in the business cycle.
3   
Third, the distributional calculations made no attempt to include the retired, even though 
the retired as a group turned out to be the key beneficiaries from a repeal of existing taxes 
on capital income.   
      The objective of this study is to address each of these weaknesses.  To begin with, we 
replicate our previous approach using data from 1995, so after the 1986 and 1993 tax 
reforms, though before the 2001 tax changes.
4  Of course, 1995 data are also affected by 
business cycle effects:  1995 was in the middle of a period of dramatic growth in the U.S.  
Our second objective is to examine the sensitivity of our estimates to such business cycle 
effects.  Finally, we develop an approach for making use of panel data that include retired 
individuals to provide more comprehensive information about the distributional effects of 
the existing tax treatment of capital. 
      The outline of the paper is as follows.  In section 2, we discuss the motivation and 
justification for the approach we take for estimating the revenue effects of existing taxes 
on capital income.  Section 3 then reexamines the revenue effects of exempting capital 
income in present value, based on the 1995 data.  Section 4 examines the sensitivity of 
these estimates to business cycle effects, while section 5 looks closely at the 
distributional effects of these existing taxes on capital income.  Section 6 provides a brief 
summary.   
  
 
2.  Approach used to assess revenue effects 
How much revenue is raised by existing taxes on capital income?  That is, how much 
revenue would be lost by shifting to an alternative tax system that no longer distorts 
savings and investment decisions?  This difference will be our estimate of how much 
revenue is collected from current taxes on the return to capital.   
                                                           
3 Note, though, that similar results were reported in Shoven (1990), using 1986 data.  Kalambokidis (1992) 
looked at the implications for corporate tax payments by industry for each year from 1975 to 1987. When 
the results of the Kalambokidis study are made consistent with the methodology in Gordon and Slemrod 
(1988), the finding is that a cash flow tax collects less revenue in aggregate than existing corporate taxes in 
each year from 1975 to 1981, more revenue in 1982 and 1983, less revenue in 1984 and 1985, and more 
revenue in 1986 and 1987.  
   4
      The immediate question is:  Relative to which alternative tax system?  There are a 
wide variety of tax structures that imply no distortions at the margin to savings and 
investment decisions.  Even among tax systems in common use, this list would include: 
payroll taxes, value added taxes, retail sales taxes, and nonlinear individual taxes on 
either wage income or consumption.  Existing pension provisions, as well as the existing 
exemption for some forms of capital income (e.g., municipal bonds) also imply no 
distortions to savings decisions.  Yet these different approaches to eliminating distortions 
to savings and investment decisions can have very different implications for tax revenue, 
implying very different changes in tax revenue relative to existing taxes.    For example, 
monopoly profits and the risk premium demanded on risky assets are both taxed under a 
value added tax or a consumption tax, yet are not taxed under a payroll tax.   While all of 
these taxes imply no distortions to savings and investment decisions, they have different 
implications, for example, for individual choices regarding forms of compensation, and 
for the riskiness of government revenue.  Our aim, in seeing how much tax revenue 
changes when distortions to savings and investment decisions are eliminated, is to choose 
a set of changes in tax provisions that eliminates distortions to savings and investment 
incentives while to the extent possible leaving other incentives and the allocation of risk 
unchanged compared to the existing tax structure. 
      To see the trade-offs more formally, consider first the tax treatment of a real 
investment costing a dollar initially, that generates a rate of return (net of depreciation) t 
periods later of ft’.  If there are no taxes and the individual’s discount rate equals r, then 
investment in equilibrium continues until  ∫
∞ − =
0
' 1 dt e f
rt
t .  We restrict attention to those 
tax systems under which the individual faces constant tax rates over time.
5   Assume now 
that the return on this investment is subject to some tax rate, τ ,  i.e.,  the output of the 
firm net of the costs of other (non-capital) inputs is taxed at rate τ .  Then the investment 
decision remains undistorted as long as the individual receives additional tax savings 
whose present value equals τ .  To see this, note that the resulting equilibrium condition 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 changed tax rates considerably, but involved no direct 
changes in the tax treatment of capital income.   
5 When tax rates change over time, distortions to savings/investment decisions can arise whenever extra 
savings/investment reduces taxable income in one period and raises it in another, as occurs under a VAT or 
under existing pension plans.     5
with such a tax,  ∫
∞ − + − =
0
' ) 1 ( 1 τ τ dt e f
rt
t , immediately implies that  ∫
∞ − =
0
' 1 dt e f
rt
t , so that 
marginal investment decisions remain undistorted: the social return to the investment is 
just sufficient to cover the opportunity cost of funds.
6 
      There remain two dimensions of flexibility in designing such a non-distorting tax on 
real investments.  First, the choice of tax rate τ  is arbitrary: investment decisions remain 
undistorted for any choice of τ .  However, the choice of τ  has a variety of other 
implications.  To begin with, if the production function has decreasing returns to scale, 
then inframarginal profits are also taxed at rate τ , affecting the incentive on 
entrepreneurs to discover a new technology that would generate such pure profits.  In 
addition, as emphasized by Gordon and Slemrod (2000), any differences between τ  and 
an employee’s (manager’s) personal tax rate creates incentives favoring forms of 
compensation taxed at the lower rate.  For example, if an employee in the United States is 
paid with qualified stock options rather than wages, the firm no longer gets a tax 
deduction, raising the amount of income taxed at rate τ , but the employee no longer pays 
personal taxes on her compensation.  Similarly, Cullen and Gordon (2002) show in detail 
how any differences between τ and a potential entrepreneur’s personal tax rate distort the 
incentives to become self-employed.  Finally, if the return to an investment is risky, then 
the choice of tax rate τ  affects the allocation of risk between shareholders and the 
government.  With a higher τ , not only does the government bear more risk, but it 
receives τ  percent of the risk premium built into the expected return on the investment, 
implying higher expected tax revenue.
7  
      In shifting to a tax system that no longer distorts investment decisions, we chose to 
leave unchanged the existing tax rate structure on income from any investment.  By doing 
so, we leave unaffected the allocation of risk (so don’t need to compensate for changing 
costs of risk bearing), leave entrepreneurial incentives unaffected, and leave income-
shifting incentives unaffected.  The intent is to isolate the revenue effects of distortions to 
investment decisions per se, rather than to combine this with the revenue effects from 
changes in other preexisting distortions.   
                                                           
6 While the tax does not distort marginal investment decisions, however, it can have general equilibrium 
effects on the market-clearing interest rates, due to any redistribution that occurs under the tax, e.g. through 
taxes on monopoly rents.     6
      In addition to the flexibility in the choice of τ , there are a wide variety of ways of 
providing tax savings whose present value equals τ .  The simplest approach, defined by 
the Meade Committee (1978) as an “R-base,” allows new investment to be immediately 
expensed, resulting in an immediate tax savings of τ .  Another approach, advocated in 
Bond, et. al. (1996), is to make use of some arbitrary schedule of depreciation deductions 
at each date, dt, but then to allow a further deduction each year equal to the interest rate 
times the remaining book value of the capital for tax purposes.  This additional interest 
deduction precisely compensates for the postponement of the remaining depreciation 
deductions, so that the present value of depreciation plus interest deductions equals the 
initial dollar spent, saving taxes in present value equal to τ .  From our perspective, this 
latter approach opens up too many judgment calls in coming up with a measure of book 
capital and choosing the appropriate interest rate.
8  We therefore used an “R-base.”  Note 
that this need not even have much effect on the timing of the resulting taxable income.  If 
investment has been growing at a rate equal to the interest rate,
9 then new investment 
equals  K d r ) ( + , where d is the true depreciation rate.  Expensing for new investment 
then leads to the same deductions in each year as result from following the Bond, et. al. 
(1996) approach, assuming economic depreciation rates.   
      The same flexibility exists in designing a tax on income from financial investments 
that does not distort savings decisions.  Again, if the amount received from a dollar’s 
financial investment is taxed at some rate t, then the tax has no effect on savings 
incentives if the individual receives additional tax savings with present value equal to t.
10 
This is exactly what occurs under a pension plan as long as the tax rate faced when initial 
contributions are deducted from taxable income equals the tax rate faced on payouts from 
the pension plan.  Again, the choice of t is flexible.   
      For many of the same reasons as with the choice of τ , our hope was to leave the tax 
rate on the return from the investment unchanged.  To begin with, by doing so, we would 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 To calculate the certainty-equivalent revenue, this risk premium would need to be subtracted off. 
8 One problem in constructing the book capital stock is that information on corporate vs. non-corporate 
investment has been limited in the past.  The appropriate interest rate is the rate that would prevail with this 
tax change, so is not one observed in the data.   
9 In the U.S. between 1959 and 1997, the overall average yearly growth rate in real nonresidential fixed 
investment was 4.6%.   
10 Taxing the amount received from financial assets, but allowing a deduction for new investments in 
financial assets, is referred to as an “F-base” by the Meade Committee.   7
leave unchanged the allocation of risk.  Also, for example, we would leave unchanged the 
incentive to invest time in portfolio management, where the return to this effort (the 
higher resulting portfolio return) is currently taxed at the individual’s personal tax rate.  
We would also leave unchanged taxes due on labor income that has been converted into 
capital gains, e.g., through the use of qualified stock options.  Furthermore, we would 
avoid opening up a new route for tax evasion through converting real income into 
financial income, and financial deductions into real deductions.
11  Consistent with this 
desire, we left unchanged the current tax treatment of pensions.  However, for financial 
investments outside of pension plans, this approach was infeasible since we have no data 
on the size of net investments or net withdrawals from savings.  The only feasible 
approach was to set t=0 for these investments.  As a result, in order to eliminate any 
distortions to savings incentives, we drop dividends, interest income, and realized capital 
gains from the tax base, and eliminate any interest deductions.   
      The result is a  (hopefully slight) overestimate of the revenue collected from current 
taxes on capital income.  By eliminating taxes as well on capital gains from some forms 
of labor income (e.g., qualified stock options, portfolio management, and entrepreneurial 
activity more generally) and eliminating taxes on the risk premium embodied in capital 
gains, tax revenue under our alternative tax is artificially lower.  As a result, the drop in 
tax revenue is greater than it would be if only distortions to savings incentives were 
eliminated.   
One question we faced is what to do with financial intermediaries, a question that has 
long been a problem for example under avalue added tax.
12  By eliminating all financial 
income from the tax base for financial corporations, this sector would not just have its tax 
liabilities eliminated, but have negative taxable income.
13  Part of the reason, for 
example, is that banks are paid for the services they provide depositors through being 
able to pay a low interest rate on deposits.  Yet this payment for the services provided by 
labor as well as capital would be eliminated from the tax base if our approach were 
                                                           
11 For example, a firm could offer to sell a good at a low price in exchange for the buyer accepting 
financing at unfavorable terms, and in the process reduce its tax payments.  
12 See for example Auerbach and Gordon (2002) for a recent discussion of this issue. 
13 In particular, a mechanical application of the proposed tax rules to the financial sector (finance, 
insurance, and real estate) would reduce their taxable income in 1995 from 146.7 billion dollars to –63.2 
billion dollars.   8
mechanically applied to the financial sector.
14  We saw no easy way to deal with this, so 
left unchanged the tax treatment of the financial sector, so that these issues do not affect 
our reported results.   
      To understand the differences in the tax base among the various taxes that do not 
distort investment incentives, one other issue comes up.  A value added tax consists not 
only of an R-base, but this combined with a cash-flow tax on imports minus exports.  
Given that in present value, trade should be balanced, the present value of revenues from 
any tax on net trade flows should be zero.  However, a tax on net trade flows does help 
pick up earnings that have been hidden abroad, e.g., through transfer pricing, when they 
are spent buying consumption goods.   So imposing a tax on trade flows should in fact 
result in extra tax revenue on a part of the return ft’ that has evaded tax.  Given the wide 
swings in trade flows over time, however, it is impossible to estimate the increase in the 
present value of revenue using data on trade flows over a short time period, let alone in 
one year.  We therefore leave net trade flows out of the alternative tax base, so again 
overestimate the amount of revenue currently collected from taxes on capital income.  
    
3.  Replication of GS Revenue Results 
3.1 Corporate Revenue Implications 
In summary, our procedure for judging how much tax revenue would change if 
investment distortions were eliminated, while leaving all other incentives unchanged, is 
to shift to an R-base, while leaving tax rates and the tax base otherwise unchanged.  The 
resulting changes in corporate taxable income would involve replacing current deductions 
for depreciation, amortization, and depletion with immediate expensing for new 
investment.
15  In addition, we eliminate all tax consequences of income from financial 
assets, so eliminate interest, dividend, and capital gains income, and also eliminate all 
interest deductions.  Finally, we need to shift the tax treatment of investment in 
inventories, allowing an immediate deduction when goods are added to inventory rather 
than a deduction when goods are withdrawn from inventory.   
                                                           
14 These payments would be captured under an F-base, but are missed under an R-base. 
15 In 1983, to have neutral investment incentives, we also needed to eliminate the investment tax credit.     9
This is the procedure used in GS (1988), using U.S. corporate tax return data for 
1983.  The resulting changes to the corporate tax base are listed in column 1 of Table 1.  
They found that in 1983 under an R-base tax, taxable corporate income of non-financial 
corporations would increase by $26.8 billion.  Replacing depreciation, depletion, and 
amortization, which together totaled $228.8 billion, by expensing of new investment 
amounting to $259.0 billion would reduce the tax base by $30.2 billion.  Eliminating 
from the tax base net capital gains and dividends would reduce the tax base another $25.0 
billion, and allowing inventory expensing would reduce it another $14.6 billion.  But 
these reductions in the tax base totaling $69.8 billion are more than offset by the 
elimination of $96.6 billion of net interest deductions, so that the cash flow base exceeds 
the actual tax base by $26.8 billion.  Based on an effective marginal corporate tax rate of 
31.8%, GS estimated that tax payments by these companies would rise by $8.5 billion. 
Elimination of the since-abolished investment tax credit would increase revenue by 
another $14.1 billion, increasing the total to $22.6 billion.  
In this paper, we replicate this procedure using U.S. corporate tax return data for 
1995.  Results appear in the second column in Table 1.
16  Had the figures grown in 
proportion to overall corporate tax payments, then the net increase in corporate tax 
liability in 1995 from shifting to an R base should have been $95.9 billion.  In striking 
contrast to the 1983 calculations, we find that in 1995 tax liability under the R base was  
$18.0 billion below what it was under the existing corporate income tax.  Existing 
corporate income taxes from these firms were $110.4 billion, suggesting that the fraction 
18.0/110.4 = .163 of existing taxes would be lost through a shift to a cash-flow tax.  
We can identify two important factors behind the differing results in 1983 compared 
to 1995.  The first is that the ratio of capital allowances (depreciation, amortization, and 
depletion) to new investment is significantly lower in 1995 compared to 1983, 78.1% 
compared to 88.3%.  This implies that moving to the expensing of new investment would 
cost more tax revenue in 1995 than it would have in 1983.  Of course, any change in the 
ratio of capital allowances to new investment could be due to changes either in 
depreciation provisions, e.g., due to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, or in the rate of new 
investment, due for example to 1995 being a boom period rather than the tail end of a 
                                                           
16 The details of these calculations appear in the appendix.   10
recession.  In fact, the cyclical nature of investment rates in the two years we have 
studied is large.  For example, total fixed investment during 1983 was only 97.5% of its 
average real value during the previous five years, based on NIPA statistics from the 1999 
Economic Report of the President.  In contrast, total fixed investment during 1995 was 
118.1% of its average real value during 1990-4.  If reported investment in 1995 had been 
equal to the same fraction of the average investment rate during the previous five years as 
was observed in 1983, putting the two years at the same point in the business cycle, then 
the reported investment rate in 1995 would have been 504.5*(1-.975/1.181)=$88 billion 
smaller.  This cyclical fluctuation in investment rates therefore is more than sufficient to 
explain the change in the ratio of depreciation deductions to new investment from 1983 to 
1995.
17 
A second factor explaining the difference in results between the two years is a 
significant change in the relative size of net interest payments that are part of the 
corporate income tax base but are not part of the R base.  In 1983 the corporate sector had 
$96.6 billion of net interest payments, amounting to 37.3% of new investment.  These 
outflows have no tax consequences under an R-base tax, so that taxable income rises in 
the switch from the existing corporate income tax.  By 1995, though, these net interest 
payments amounted to only 26.0% of new investment ($131.1 billion divided by $504.5 
billion).  If the 1983 ratio of 37.3% had prevailed in 1995, R-base taxable income would 
have been $57 billion higher than we calculate it to be.  The main explanation for the 
change appears to be the drop in the level of nominal interest rates between 1983 and 
1995.  For example, the Baa corporate bond rate dropped from 13.55% to 8.20%.  If net 
interest deductions in 1995 had been larger by the proportion .1355/.082, then the net 
change in taxable income would have been higher by $85.5 billion.   
In sum, while the shift from the existing income tax to an R-based tax would have 
caused an increase in corporate tax payments by 22.6 billion dollars in 1983, the same 
policy change would have caused a decrease in corporate tax payments by 18.0 billion 
dollars in 1995.  This change in outcomes is of the same order of magnitude as back-of-
the-envelope calculations of the impact of the difference in the state of the business cycle 
                                                           
17 Depreciation allowances in 1995 could well have been more generous than in 1983, in spite of the slower 
depreciation rates enacted in 1986, due to the simultaneous drop in the inflation rate.     11
in the two years, combined with the effects of the drop in inflation and so in nominal 
interest rates.   In section 4, we examine more closely the question of what the results in 
these two years would have looked like at a “typical” point in the business cycle.   
  
3.2 Personal Tax Revenue Implications 
We next estimate the change in personal tax payments that would result from a shift 
to an R-base.  We simulate this by exempting from personal taxation all interest 
income/payments, dividends, and capital gains, and by shifting to an “R-base” for all 
non-corporate business income.  Since we observe on the individual’s tax return only the 
net profits/losses from each form of non-corporate business, we use aggregate data to 
calculate the ratio of the aggregate “R-base”
18 from each sector to its reported profits and 
multiply the reported profits for each individual by this ratio.  This calculation is done 
separately for each type of non-corporate business, and separately for firms with profits 
vs. losses. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of this methodology for 1983 and 1995. Column 1 
reports the resulting changes in aggregate taxable personal income reported by GS (1988) 
using this approach for a representative sample of personal income tax returns from 1983.  
They found that shifting to an R-base under the personal income tax would reduce 
taxable income by $98.6 billion.  When netted against the elimination of $4.3 billion of 
investment tax credits, this would have reduced individual tax liability by $15.2 billion, 
or about one percent of total taxable income.
19   Given that corporate tax payments 
increased by $22.6 billion dollars under an R-base, on net we estimate that the aggregate 
change in net tax payments would be an increase of $7.4 billion, a very small fraction of 
tax revenue in 1983.  Given the assumptions and imputations needed to make these 
                                                           
18 To do this, we zero out net interest income/payments, dividend income, and capital gains, and replace 
depreciation deductions with expensing for new investment.  In principle under an R-base, any transfer or 
sale of capital from one firm to another should result in the taxation of the resulting sales revenue in the 
selling firm and the deduction of the purchase price in the buying firm.  We had no data available to do this.  
While this correction is irrelevant if both firms face the same tax rate, this would not be the case for any 
transfers of capital between the corporate and the noncorporate sectors, nor for many transfers within the 
noncorporate sector.    
19 Note that any reduction in payouts on corporate equity, due to the forecasted $22.6 billion dollar increase 
in corporate tax liabilities, has no direct impact on personal tax payments, since dividends and capital gains 
are both exempt from tax under an R-base.     12
calculations, it is fair to say that GS (1988) estimated that there would be approximately 
no change in tax revenue in switching to a modified cash flow (R-base) tax. 
  The 1995 results displayed in Column 2 are noticeably different.
20  First, consider 
net taxable (non-business) interest income.  This was a positive $33.8 billion in 1983, so 
that zeroing it out would reduce revenue.  By 1995, this was negative $61.0 billion, 
because interest deductions exceeded interest received.  Thus, in 1995 exempting interest 
flows from taxation would have increased rather than decreased tax revenue.  Offsetting 
this change, however, is the fact that our estimate of other capital income, which includes 
dividends, net capital and non-capital gains, and the portion of non-corporate business 
income that would be exempted under the R-based tax, increased from $64.7 billion in 
1983 to $292.5 billion in 1995, or from 4.2% of taxable income to 10.4% of taxable 
income.
21  Exempting this much larger amount of capital income from taxation under the 
R-base tax more than offsets the implications of the decline in net taxable interest 
income.  All in all, then, we estimate that in 1995 taxable income under the R base tax 
would fall by $231.5 billion, resulting in a $90.1 billion loss in tax liability.
22  This is 
3.2% of taxable income, compared to the corresponding estimate of 1.0% in 1983.  
Combining the corporate and personal tax results, we estimate that moving to an R- 
base tax would in 1995 have caused a decline of $108.1 billion of revenue.  In 1983, it 
would have increased revenue by $7.4 billion.  Of course, neither year is typical.  This is 
the issue we turn to next.  
 
4.  Controlling revenue figures for business cycle effects 
 
The above figures for 1983 and 1995 for the revenue effects of shifting from the existing 
tax structure to an R-base are inevitably sensitive to business-cycle effects.  The cycle 
will affect revenue collected under the existing income tax, what would be collected 
                                                           
20 The details of these calculations appear in the appendix. 
21 Much of this change represents the growth in realized capital gains between the two years.  Since 1983 
was in the middle of a deep recession while 1995 was in the middle of a period of rapid growth, this may 
largely reflect business cycle effects rather than permanent differences in the tax structure.  See section 4 
for further discussion.    
22 The distribution of the changes in taxable income across tax brackets, as seen below, was very different 
in 1995 than in 1983.  Note for example that the average tax rate on the change in tax base in 1983 was 
(15.2-4.3)/98.6=11, while in 1995 it was 90.1/231.5=.39.   13
under an R-base tax, and the difference between the two that is the focus of this paper.  
Yet, in comparing the revenue collected from existing taxes on capital income with the 
efficiency costs, we would hope to have a figure that represents a “typical” point in any 
business cycle or an average over an entire business cycle. 
      The question is how best to do this.  In the previous section we did some back-of-the-
envelope calculations with respect to the corporate tax estimates.  A direct way to adjust 
the revenue changes for business cycle effects would be to calculate these revenue 
changes over a full business cycle, under a given tax code, and then take the average of 
these figures, perhaps scaled by nominal GDP to control for growth in the economy 
during the period.  The immediate difficulty is that the tax law changes sufficiently 
frequently that we do not commonly observe the revenue effects of a given tax law over a 
full business cycle.  For example, even if we claim that the tax law in effect in 1995 was 
largely that enacted in 1986, and so was in effect since 1988, at the time of writing of this 
paper we do not have the data to proceed through a full business cycle starting from 
1988.  In any case, the tax law changed substantially in 2002, before this business cycle 
was complete.  
In what follows we pursue an alternative strategy by examining an earlier 
business cycle during which the tax law itself was stable.  The latest full business cycle 
that satisfies this restriction is that between 1975 and 1980.  According to the NBER 
Business Cycle Dating Committee, a complete cycle ran from the trough of the first 
quarter of 1975, through the peak in the first quarter of 1980, to the next trough of the 
third quarter of 1980.  Fortunately, Kalambokidis (1992) has already performed the 
calculations needed to estimate the changes in taxable corporate income, when shifting to 
an R-base, for each year during this period.  These numbers, as a fraction of gross 
domestic product, are presented in the first column of Table 3. 
As expected, the results are indeed sensitive to the business cycle, with less 
revenue loss from switching to an R-base tax during the recession years of 1975 and 
1980.  The details behind these calculations suggest that one key element of the variation 
over the cycle arose from the timing of inventory investment.   In particular, at the very 
end of a boom period, inventory investment tends to be very high.      14
      How can these figures be used to adjust our results for 1983 and 1995 for business 
cycle effects?   We proceed as follows.  We first calculate the average of the figures in 
column A in Table 3 as the “typical” figure over the business cycle, given the tax law 
prevailing during this period.  During other business cycles, under other tax laws, we 
presume that the mean of this figure will change, but not the variance.  A judgment call is 
then to link 1983, the first year of rapid growth following a downturn with the data with 
1976.
23  Similarly, we link 1995 with 1978, a year in the middle of an upturn.  We then 
take the difference between the average value in column A of Table 3 and the figure in 
the comparable year, and add this fraction of GDP to the figures we produced in Table 1.   
The difference between the six-year average change in corporate taxable income 
and the 1976 change in corporate taxable income, as a percentage of GDP, is -0.09 
percent.  This percentage times 1983 GDP of $3,514.5 billion gives us a business cycle 
adjustment for 1983 of $3.2 billion.  We then find that the change in corporate taxable 
income in 1983, correcting for business cycle effects, would be reduced from $26.8 
billion to $23.6 billion (as shown in Table 4).  Using the average effective tax rate in 
1983 of 0.318, the business-cycle-adjusted change in corporate tax liability would be 
$21.6 billion, or one billion dollars less that the value in Table 1. 
The difference between the six-year average change in corporate taxable income 
and the 1978 change in corporate taxable income, as a percentage of GDP, is 0.68 
percent.  This percentage times 1995 GDP of $7,269.6 billion gives us a business cycle 
adjustment for 1995 of $49.4 billion, and (using the 1995 effective tax rate of 0.351) a 
corporate tax liability adjustment of $17.3 billion.  For 1995, the business-cycle-adjusted 
change in corporate taxable income is -$1.8 billion (as shown in Table 4).  The business-
cycle-adjusted change in corporate tax liability for 1995 is -$0.7 billion. 
      Comparable figures for changes in aggregate personal taxable income are also 
reported in Table 3.  In making use of these figures to adjust those reported in Table 2 for 
business cycle effects, we need to make a variety of assumptions.  As above, we assume 
that the mean value in column B in Table 3 will change under a different tax code, but 
that the size of the variation across the business cycle will remain stable.  A further issue 
                                                           
23 For example, real GDP growth in 1983 was 4.3%, compared with a 2.0% decline in 1982.  The 
comparable figures for 1976 and 1975 were 5.6% and -0.4%.     15
is the distribution of these changes across tax brackets.  Here we assume that the figures 
in each tax bracket are simply scaled upwards or downwards with the aggregate figures, 
and ignore changes in the degree of tax arbitrage over the business cycle.  The cyclical 
variation of personal taxable income is apparently much less than for corporate taxable 
income.  For 1976 (our match to 1983), the change is just 0.22 percent below the six-year 
average and for 1978 (our 1995 match), the change is just 0.03 percent below the six-year 
average.  Under these assumptions, we find that in 1983 the change in personal taxable 
income due to the switch to an R-base tax, correcting for business cycle effects, would be 
increased by $7.7 billion to -$90.9 billion.  Using the average tax rate applying to 
changes in personal income of 0.154 (15.2/98.6) implies an adjusted change in personal 
tax liability of -$14.0 billion instead of -$15.2 billion.  For 1995, the business cycle 
adjustment reduces the change in personal taxable income by $2.2 billion, for an adjusted 
value of -$233.7 billion.  This corresponds to an adjustment in personal tax liability of -
$0.9 billion, changing the estimated effect of moving to an R-base in 1995 from -$90.1 
billion to -$91.0 billion.   
  In sum then, as shown in Table 4, we estimate that the shift to an R-base would 
have increased total tax liability by $7.6 billion in 1983, adjusting for business cycle 
effects.  In 1995, the tax change would have resulted in a business-cycle-adjusted tax 
decrease of $91.7 billion.  As the back-of-the-envelope calculations of Section 3 
suggested, the business cycle does have substantial effects on the corporate calculations.  
The calculations of this section suggest further that, at a typical point in the business 
cycle, moving to an R-base tax would cause tiny revenue losses, or even revenue gains.  
The business cycle has a relatively small effect on our estimates of how the shift to an R-
base tax would affect personal tax collections.  Our cycle-adjusted estimates of the 
overall change in total tax liability are not qualitatively different from our unadjusted 
estimates: a small increase in tax in 1983, and a larger decrease in 1995.  
   
5.  Distribution effects of shifting to an R-base tax 
5.1 Replication of procedure used with 1983 data   16
GS also provided some estimates of the distributional impact of moving to an R-base  
tax system.
24  In particular, GS estimated the change in after-tax income of different types 
of individuals had the 1983 tax law included the proposed modifications.  They first 
calculated the change in personal tax payments for each individual, resulting from this tax 
change.  Then they added in each individual’s share of any changes in corporate taxes, 
under the assumption that corporate taxes are borne in proportion to dividend income.    
  In GS the measure of well being used to classify individuals was labor income.
25  
In principle, our preferred measure would have been the present value of lifetime 
earnings.  This, of course, is not observed in our data.  However, labor income is 
relatively stable over an individual’s lifetime, and should be highly correlated with the 
present value of the individual’s lifetime income.  However, because current labor 
income is not an accurate measure of economic position for those who are fully or 
partially retired, GS separately treated households who report a member over the age of 
65.  These results were reported separately, with no attempt to stratify them by ability 
group.  
       One issue in comparing figures over time is that the net change in tax revenue was 
very different in the two years.  To make the figures more comparable, we include a 
comparison of revenue-neutral tax changes, where any revenue effects of shifting to an 
R-base are offset by a proportional tax on labor income. 
 The results using the 1983 data are reported in Table 5.
26  Because the revenue-
neutral tax change is so small in this case (a 0.41% tax cut to make up for the $7.36 
                                                           
24 Gentry and Hubbard (1997) also try to tabulate the distributional effects of moving from the existing tax 
system to one that does not distort the incentives to save and invest.  Their approach and their source of 
data are both very different from ours.  A key difference is that they assume a flat-rate structure in 
comparing these tax bases, eliminating much of the distributional effects of existing tax arbitrage.  In 
contrast, GS (1988) found that the losses in particular from arbitrage with debt were a dominant 
consideration.  Another key difference is that Gentry and Hubbard make no direct attempt to assess the 
implications for corporate tax payments of this shift to a tax base exempting capital income, simply 
assuming that corporate taxable income will fall by 40%.  As seen in Table 1, this assumption is very 
different from our findings. 
25 Here, labor income is defined to equal the sum of wage and salary income, unemployment compensation, 
pension income, and the labor income component of business income, minus employee business expense.  
The labor income component of business income was set equal to the real cash flow from the business, 
replacing depreciation with expensing of new investment but eliminating interest deductions.  (The ratio of 
labor to total income from a business was computed using aggregate data, separately for firms with profits 
and losses, and this ratio was then applied to each individual’s business income.) 
26 These results differ from those reported in Table 5 and 6 in the earlier paper because we focus here on 
tax changes in the non-financial sector only.   17
billion tax increase that we estimate would happen in the switch to an R-base tax), the 
results are not much different in the revenue-neutral case.  One striking results is that the 
elderly would gain considerably, with an increase in after-tax income of more than 
14%.
27  In contrast, those with labor incomes between $20,000 and $100,000 (1983 
dollars) would be worse off, both because they end up paying more in personal taxes (due 
to as a group having negative taxable capital income), and because they would have 
lower pre-tax income when corporate taxes rise. The results for the highest income group 
(more than $100,000 of labor income) are particularly intriguing.  Ignoring the change in 
corporate taxes, this group would gain, because of the elimination of personal tax on net 
personal financial income.  However, because they are significant owners of corporate 
stock, they would lose due to the increased corporate level taxes, and taking both effects 
into account they have a net loss. Another notable result is that those in the lowest 
income group (with labor income below $20,000) come out slightly ahead. So, the two 
groups that we estimate would benefit from a switch to an R-base tax are the poor non-
elderly and the elderly. 
   For the 1995 data, we first recalculated the distributional effects of the tax reform 
for the non-elderly, using the same procedure as before but with the 1995 data.
28 Table 6 
reports the per-return net gain or loss from the tax reform for those in each decile, based 
on their estimated net labor income. For this year, the distinction between the unadjusted 
and revenue-neutral results is much more significant, because in order to make up for the 
revenue loss a 2.8% levy on labor income is required.  Compared to 1983, some 
interesting similarities and differences arise. Recall that for 1983, the elderly were net 
winners and the non-elderly net losers; among the non-elderly, the lower income classes 
gained and the upper-income groups lost, although the highest income group about broke 
even.  Without the revenue-neutral tax levy, in 1995 both the non-elderly and elderly 
come out ahead, although the per-return gain for the elderly is much higher compared to 
the per-return gain for the non-elderly.  Within the non-elderly, the U-shaped pattern of 
gain appears again.  The lowest eight income groups gain on average, the ninth loses, and 
                                                           
27 The distributions of sources of income that underlie these calculations are presented in Tables A1 and 
A2. 
28 The elderly were defined a bit more broadly than before, including not only those claiming a deduction 
for a household member over age 65 but also those reporting nonzero pension or Social Security income.   18
those in the highest group on average come out ahead.  One key difference is that in 1983 
the slight increase in corporate tax collections offset the gains on individual income tax 
for the highest income group.  In 1995 the corporate tax decline under the R-base tax 
adds to, rather than offsets, the personal tax changes, so that the highest income group 
profits from both changes. 
When the 2.8% labor income tax is levied to make the switch to an R-base tax 
revenue-neutral, as in 1983 the elderly (including, in this case, the recipients of retirement 
income) gain and the non-elderly lose. As in 1983, though, the poor among the non-
elderly come out ahead.
29  Perhaps most strikingly, those in the highest decile among the 
non-elderly also gain on average.  All in all, the U-shaped pattern of distributional effect 
as well as the tendency for the elderly to gain at the expense of the non-elderly appears in 
both 1983 and 1995.
30 
 
5.2 Closer examination of the distributional effects among the elderly 
      GS did not attempt to include the figures for the elderly in their distributional tables, 
since we saw no easy way to report these figures separately by ability group.  Among the 
non-elderly, individuals were classified based on their labor income.  While not entirely 
stable over a lifetime, annual labor income is still highly correlated with lifetime labor 
income.  For the retired, however, current labor income provides little or no information 
about their lifetime earnings. 
  To provide further information about the distributional effects among the elderly, 
we use the information on their tax return to forecast what their earnings were when they 
were aged 55, and then look at the net gains/losses among the elderly from shifting to an 
R-base as a function of their earnings at age 55.   
      To do this, we first put together a sample of individuals from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics in which the household head was age 55 at some point between 1967 
                                                           
29 As shown in Table A1, the aggregate estimated labor income of those non-elderly in the lowest decile is 
negative.  This occurs because our measure of labor income includes a percentage of noncorporate business 
income and losses.  In aggregate, the taxpayers in the first decile had significant net losses from  
noncorporate businesses, as reported on Schedules C, E, and F.  Therefore, the first decile combines some 
genuinely poor taxpayers with taxpayers who might not be thought of as poor but happened to incur large 
business losses in 1995.  The methodology for estimating labor income and the percentages of Schedule C, 
E, and F income and losses that were used appear in the appendix.   19
and 1976.  Our basic strategy is to estimate labor income at age 55 as a function of 
information available at older ages contained as well on the tax return for the retired: 
wage and salary income, “passive” income (dividends, interest, rent, royalties, and 
income from trusts), business income, farm income, Social Security benefits, pension 
income, unemployment compensation, alimony received, and marital status.
31  Our 
estimation sample includes data from all subsequent years in which the household would 
be classified as retired according to our definition.  The resulting regression can be 
denoted by 
Yi = Xiβ  + ε i.        (1) 
Results are reported in Table A3. 
  If we could in fact observe true income at age 55, we could then use the following 
equation to characterize the distributional effects of this tax change among the elderly: 
    ∆ i = g(Yi) + η i,      (2) 
where ∆ i is the net gain/loss from the tax reform, Yi again is true income at age 55, and 
g(Yi) is a set of ten dummy variables indicating which decile of the earnings distribution 
Yi is in.  The coefficients of the ten dummy variables would then correspond to the results 
reported in Table 6 for the non-elderly. 
  The trouble is that we do not observe Yi.  Instead, we run an implicit first stage 
regression equal to 
   g(Yi) = Eg(Xiβ  + ε i) + vi,       ( 3 )  
and a second-stage regression equal to 
   ∆ i = Eg(Xiβ  + ε i) + (η i + vi).         (4) 
To implement the first stage regression, we first assumed that ε i is distributed normally, 
with standard deviation that is a function of the Xi.
32  Next, we calculated the breakpoint 
between the earnings deciles by simulating the distribution of true labor income at age 55 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 These figures ignore transition issues, general equilibrium changes in market prices, and any welfare 
gains due to the resulting changes in efficiency.  See below for further discussion.   
31 In addition, dummy variables were included for the year the individual was age 55 and the year of the 
retirement data, to control for the effects of inflation and real income growth. 
32 In particular, we regressed the absolute value of the ε i on the Xi, and used the resulting forecast as the 
standard deviation for each household. The estimated regression is shown in Table A3.   20
and locating the income levels that divide the distribution into ten deciles.
33  Given that 
g(Yi) is a set of ten dummy variables, Eg(Xiβ  + ε i) equals the vector of probabilities that 
the true income of household i is in each of the ten deciles, given the information set Xi.  
With ε i distributed normally, it is easy to calculate these ten probabilities.  Equation (4) 
can then be estimated using these constructed probability estimates and the observed 
values of ∆ i.   
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 7.  Note first, as also shown in 
Table 6, that ignoring the revenue-neutral 2.8% labor income levy the average per-return 
gain among the elderly population is about three and a half times higher than it is among 
the non-elderly, $2,056 versus $607.  The gain among the elderly is concentrated among 
the top decile, but not nearly as starkly as among the non-elderly. Ignoring the revenue-
neutral tax adjustment 31.2% of the total gain accrues to the top decile among the elderly 
versus 74.1% among the non-elderly.  With the revenue-neutral adjustment, the fraction 
is 33.3%, rather than 31.2%. The U-shaped pattern of gains also appears, but not nearly 
as starkly as among the non-elderly. One clear difference is that, among the elderly, the 
gain does not erode among the eighth and, especially, the ninth, deciles, even after the 
2.8% levy on labor income.  Rather, the estimated per-return gain from moving to the R-
base tax increases monotonically from the second decile to the tenth.   
A natural next step would be to use the results from Tables 6 and 7 to draw 
conclusions about the lifetime incidence of the switch to an R-base tax as a function of 
lifetime income.  If people stayed within the same decile throughout their life, then the 
combined numbers would approximate the present value of effects experienced by a 
typical individual in each decile over his or her lifetime.  In particular, let  ict ∆ denote the 
net gain/loss for individuals in cohort i in birth cohort c in year t.  Then, if the discount 
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Instead, we observe a cross section of individuals.  Assume that incomes, and these net 
gains/losses, grow proportionately with time at rate g due to overall growth in the 
economy.  Then the observed average gain, across all cohorts, in a given decile equals  
                                                           
33 To do this, we drew twenty-five random values of ε i (with the appropriate standard deviation) for each 
household, pooled data on Xiβ  + ε i across households, ordered these values, and located the nine 
breakpoints.   21
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If g=r, then this average gain in the cross section equals the discounted present value of 
 
 the gain for the youngest cohort in the time series.  This suggests that, of the $108.1 
billion in increased after-tax income, about half would accrue to those taxpayers, elderly 
and not, who fall into the top decile of their income distribution, and who receive about 
the same fraction of labor income.  Among the rest of the population, the benefits would 
disproportionately accrue to taxpayers with low labor income. 
 Of course, most people do not stay within a given decile of labor income 
throughout their lifetime.  To overcome this, one could estimate, using perhaps the PSID 
data, labor income at age 55 for the non-elderly population, and use that as the measure 
of permanent income for all taxpayers.  We have not attempted to pursue that strategy.  
 
5.3  Remaining omissions from distributional forecasts  
a.   Behavioral changes   
The above calculations ignore any behavioral changes.  Any changes in savings, 
investment, and portfolio choice have no direct implications for tax revenue, since the tax 
structure being considered collects no revenue in present value on the marginal rate of 
return to savings and investment.  However, behavioral changes do affect utility.   
Starting from the old allocation, the benefit from a marginal change in behavior had 
previously been just offset by the resulting tax cost.  Under the new law, the benefit from 
the same marginal change from the old equilibrium behavior equals the tax cost no longer 
paid.  At the new equilibrium allocation, the benefit from a marginal change in behavior 
is zero.  On average, the total benefits to the individual are approximated by the 
Harberger triangle: 0.5 dX T, where T is the initial tax distortion affecting some decision, 
and dX is the total change in this decision in response to the new law. This figure 
represents gains in utility for investors that should be taken into account in a complete  
distributional analysis.  The types of behavior that can change in response to the tax 
reform include not only savings and investment rates, but also dividend payout rates,   22
rates of capital gains realizations, portfolio composition, corporate financial policies, 
extent of financial intermediation, international diversification, etc.  Coming up with any 
plausible estimates, by tax bracket, for these gains goes far beyond what we can do in this 
paper.  Given the presumption that the efficiency costs from existing taxes on capital 
income are large, the correction to the figures we report in Tables 6-7 due to behavioral 
changes would be large as well.  These gains would go primarily to those facing the 
largest tax distortions under existing law, so primarily to those in the highest tax brackets.   
 
b.  Changes in market rates of return   
Another issue neglected in the above figures is the distributional implications of any 
changes in the market interest rate, in the prices or future rates of return on existing 
equity, or in market wage rates.  The above calculations implicitly held these prices fixed.  
Yet these tax changes inevitably would have some impact on market prices.  For 
example, at the initial interest rate, the elimination of the deductibility of interest should 
cause a fall in the demand for loans, while the exemption of interest income should 
increase the demand for interest-bearing assets.  Together these changes in behavior will 
induce a fall in interest rates, at least in a closed economy, aiding borrowers and hurting 
investors in taxable bonds.  Given observed borrowing and lending behavior, this aids 
those in higher tax brackets, and hurts those in lower tax brackets.   In addition, the shift 
from depreciation to expensing should increase demand for capital, raising both wage 
rates and market interest rates, with the relative changes depending on relative 
elasticities.  In an open economy, however, the interest rate should be largely set in the 
world capital market, suggesting a rise in wage rates.   
 
c. Transition rules 
The above distributional figures ignore any transition effects of the tax change.  Yet for 
cohorts present at the time of any such change in the tax law, these transition effects can 
be large.
34  For example, the value of existing owner-occupied housing could fall, since 
the effective cost rises if mortgage interest payments are no longer deductible.  If the 
proposed tax reform were implemented without any transition rules, then it would also 
                                                           
34 For further discussion of possible such transition effects, see Gentry and Hubbard (1997).     23
involve a windfall tax on existing capital, since the added investment resulting from the 
now more favorable tax treatment of new investment would drive down the rate of return 
on existing capital relative to what was expected when the investment occurred.  What if 
instead existing capital faced the same tax treatment as new capital, so that businesses 
could receive an immediate deduction for the market value of existing assets?  In that 
case, existing assets would receive a windfall gain under the reform: investment should 
rise, yet with adjustment costs the market value of existing assets will jump at the date 
the reform is announced.    What transition rules would likely exist in practice is unclear.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Calling a tax system an income tax or a consumption tax does not make it so.  This is 
certainly true of the U.S. income tax system, which has long been recognized as a hybrid 
of an income and consumption tax, with elements that do not fit naturally into either pure 
system.  What it actually is has important policy implications for, among other things, 
understanding the impact of moving closer to a pure consumption tax regime. 
Gordon and Slemrod (1988) introduced a new methodology for shedding light on this 
issue: calculating the revenue implications of switching to one form of consumption tax, 
an R-base modified cash flow tax.  Loosely speaking, the more revenue loss this would 
cause, the greater the inferred tax levied on capital income under the existing tax system.  
Strikingly, GS concluded that in 1983 in the U.S. this switch would cost little or no 
revenue at all, suggesting that the tax burden on capital was at that time small or non-
existent.  GS also concluded that the elderly would gain considerably from a shift to an 
R-base, those of working age with moderate income would be worse off, while the lowest 
and the highest income groups would gain slightly. 
Because both the U.S. economy and tax system have changed since 1983, this paper 
revisits the GS calculation and enriches the methodology for calculating the distributional 
implications of the exercise.  The striking finding for 1983 has indeed disappeared by 
1995: a switch to an R-base tax would in 1995 cost $108.1 billion in tax revenues. One 
important reason was the drop in nominal interest rates from 1983 to 1995, reducing the 
tax savings arising from any tax arbitrage through use of debt, and thereby raising the   24
effective tax rate on capital income.  A second reason for the change is that 1995 was at a 
different point in the business cycle than 1983, with a much higher current investment 
rate relative to the depreciation deductions arising from past investments.   
Based on an extrapolation of the 1975-80 business cycle, we conclude that the 
cyclical adjustment to our baseline estimate of the change in the 1995 corporate tax 
liability from moving to an R-base tax would be of some importance, making the result 
more like our 1983 estimate.  The cyclical adjustments for the personal tax are minor, 
leaving our 1983 and 1995 estimates still very different.  If 1995 were at a more typical 
point in the business cycle, we forecast that the revenue loss from a shift to an R-base 
would instead have been $91.7 billion instead of $108.1 billion.  The 1983 revenue gain 
would be $7.6 billion instead of $7.4 billion.  Thus, this approach to adjusting for the 
business cycle suggests that the baseline 1983 and 1995 results are not much affected by 
the business cycle.  This methodology does not, though, account for the differences 
between the 1975-80 cycle and the later ones that contain 1983 and 1995.   
We also examine the distributional effects of a shift from the existing income tax to 
an R-base tax.  The net gains, as a fraction of pretax labor income, have a U-shaped 
pattern, with those in the lowest and the highest deciles having the largest proportional 
gains, though those in the highest tax bracket have by far the largest absolute gains.   
We believe that the next step in this research agenda is to clarify the behavioral and 
efficiency implications of this exercise.  To be precise, we seek to be able to make a 
statement like the following: the U.S. tax system of 1995 levied an effective tax rate on 
capital income of (108.1/capital income tax base), where both the terms “effective” and 
“capital income tax base” are rigorously defined in the context of a well-posed model of 
how taxation affects saving and investment. To do so requires a careful explication of 
what is and is not a tax at the margin of decisions, and an understanding of how arbitrage 
opportunities and income shifting possibilities affect the average and marginal effective 
tax rate.  We have begun that task in Gordon, Kalambokidis, and Slemrod (2002). 
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Table 1 
 
Corporate tax base and tax liability under current law and a simulated R-base cash flow 
tax 
1983 and 1995 
(Dollar amounts in $billions) 
 
   1983 1995 
1  Plus: net interest payments  96.6  131.1 
2  Plus: depletion, amortization, and depreciation  228.8  393.8 
3  Less: new capital investment  259.0  504.5 
4  Less: net dividend income  7.7  3.0 
5  Less: net capital and noncapital gains  17.3  48.9 
6  Less: inventory adjustment  14.6  19.7 
8  Equals: net change in taxable income  26.8  -51.2 
9  Times: average effective tax rate (current law)  
 31.8%  35.1% 
10  Equals: net change in tax liability (before 
investment tax credits)  8.5  -18.0 
11  Plus: investment tax credits net of recapture  14.1  0 
12  Equals: net change in tax liability (after 
investment tax credit)  22.6 -18.0 




Individual Tax Base Changes from Moving from Current law to  a Simulated Labor 
Income Tax Base: 1983 and 1995 
(billions of current dollars) 
 
   1983 1995 
1 Taxable  income  1,534.8  2,812.3
2  Less: Schedule B interest income  155.7  153.8
3  Less: other capital income   64.7  292.5
4  Plus: Schedule A interest deductions  121.8  214.8
5  Net changes in taxable income (- line 2 – line 3 + 
line 4 )  -98.6  -231.5
6  Investment tax credit  4.3  0
7  Implied change in tax liability (tax liability 
implications of line 5 and line 6)  -15.2  -90.1
Source: 1983 figures from Gordon and Slemrod (1988), Tables 1 and 3.  1995 figures 
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Table 3 
Estimated Change in Tax Revenue from Moving to an R-Base Tax, 1975-80 
(percentages) 
 
 A  B 
  Change in Corporate Taxable 
Income/GDP 














































































-3.2  -1.0 7.7 1.2 0.2 
Adjusted 
1983  23.6 21.6 -90.9  -14.0 7.6 
Estimated 





49.4 17.3 -2.2 -0.9 16.2 
Adjusted 
1995  -1.8 -0.7  -233.7  -91.0  -91.7 
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Table 5 
 
Changes in Per-Return Tax, Pre-tax and After-tax Income 














































<  20K  50,105,872  -143  -81 61  35 97  1.24% 
20K – 40K  23,816,452  258  -81  -339  116  -223  -0.89% 
40K – 70K  8,114,064  956  -222  -1,177  202  -976  -2.35% 
70K – 100K  1,028,676  1,424  -788  -2,213  330  -1883  -2.96% 
>100K  588,128 -1,775  -3,161 -1,386  709  -677  -0.58% 
> Age 65  11,239,388  -1,965  -1,065  900  39  939  14.77% 
Dependents  913,920  -360  -181 179  3 183  45.43% 
Total 95,806,480  -159  -236  -77  77  0  0 
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Table 6 
 
Changes in Tax, Pre-tax, and After-tax Income from Switching to a Revenue-Neutral R-







































1 -827  172  999  4  1,003 -97.92% 
2 -96  23  119  -129  -11 -0.24% 
3 -90  14  103  -245  -141 -1.70% 
4 -100  15  114  -371  -256 -2.08% 
5 -107  17  124  -514  -390 -2.32% 
6 -97  19  116  -679  -562 -2.58% 
7 -48  32  79  -890  -811 -2.87% 
8 -11  38  49  -1,170  -1,121 -3.06% 
9 194  65  -129  -1,594  -1,723 -3.49% 
10 -4,173  318  4,491  -3,439  1,052 1.11% 
Total 
non-
retired -536  71 607  -903  -296 -1.09% 
Total 
retired -1,603  453 2,056  -958  1,099 4.02% 
Total -762  152  914  -914  0 0 
aThe per return values are based on the following numbers of returns in each category:  
93,128,400 non-retired; 25,089,930 retired; 118, 218,330 total. 
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 Table 7 
 
Changes in Per-Return Tax, Pre-tax and After-tax Income 
from Switching to a Revenue-Neutral R-base Tax, 1995: 























Change in after 
tax income due 











1 -1,082  332  1,415  -506  908  6.28% 
2  -631 283 914 -482 432  2.97% 
3 -785  310  1,095  -531  564  3.53% 
4 -935  342  1,277  -603  574  3.74% 
5 -1,085  378  1,462  -687  775  3.80% 
6 -1,230  408  1,638  -782  856  3.70% 
7 -1,378  437  1,815  -897  918  3.47% 
8  -1,578  472 2,050 -1,054  996  3.22% 
9  -1,947  538 2,485 -1,274 1,211  3.28% 
10  -5,351  1,027 6,378 -2,744 3,634  5.05% 
Total 
retired  -1,603  453 2,056  -958 1,099  4.02% 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table A3: Regression Equations Based on PSID Data, Predicting Labor Income at Age 
55 and the Standard Error of the Estimated Labor Income
35 
 
  For equation predicting 
labor income at Age 55 
 
Number of obs = 5354 
R
2 = 0.2937 
For equation predicting 
standard error of 
estimated labor income 
Number of obs = 5354 
R







 6576.213  1.459  9329.844  8.161 
Dummy equal to 1 
if married, 0 
otherwise 13062.58  5.460  6151.271  4.185 
wages and salaries  .441659  3.926  .1232194  2.067 
“passive” income, 
equal to the sum 
of dividends, 
interest received, 
rent from real 
estate, trust funds, 
and royalties  .0021099  0.539  .0019073  0.701 
alimony received  -2.671929  -2.577  -2.852709  -10.040 






annuities, and IRA 
distributions .0450401  2.998 .0354144  4.176 
farm income  -.1496895  -2.073  -.041459  -1.436 
Unemployment 
compensation .4677233 0.392  -.4939948  -0.654 
Social Security 













                                                           
35 Source of data: The Panel Study of Income Dynamics, available online at 





We estimate how much tax revenue would change if investment distortions were 
eliminated by simulating a shift to an R-base tax, while leaving tax rates and the tax base 
otherwise unchanged.  The R-base tax, as described in Meade (1978), would exempt the 
net return from all financial assets and tax real assets on a cash flow basis.  Mechanically, 
this means that to simulate the R-base tax, we need to subtract from taxable income all 
financial income, add back to taxable income deductions for interest paid, and replace 
current law capital recovery allowances with a deduction for new investment.  Because 
the U.S. income tax is levied separately on individuals and corporations, we perform 
these calculations in two steps.  First, we estimate the change in taxable income and tax 
liability that would be generated by a shift from the current corporate income tax to an R-
base tax on corporations.  We next estimate the change in personal tax payments that 
would result from a shift to an R-base.  We simulate this change by exempting from 
personal taxation all financial income, by shifting to an R-base for noncorporate 
businesses, and by attributing to noncorporate business owners their share of the 
business’ R-base taxable income.  Finally, we combine these effects.  The details of these 
calculations appear below, and the results, set by step, appear in Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
    
Calculating R-base taxable income for corporations 
 
Under the R-base tax, real assets are taxed on their cash flow, but cash flow from 
financial assets is made tax exempt.  To calculate the difference between this tax base and 
the actual 1995 tax base for nonfinancial Subchapter C corporations, we used aggregate 
corporate income tax data published by the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal 
Revenue Service (SOI).
36  The calculations appear in Table 1, and the procedure is 
described below. 
 
First, we eliminated net interest payments, net capital gains, and net gains from 
noncapital assets from taxable income.  Here, capital gains are measured by capital gains 
taxed at ordinary rates plus 28/35 of capital gains taxable at the alternative rate of 28 
percent.  In addition, we eliminated net dividend income from taxable income, where net 
dividend income is defined to equal 80 percent of domestic dividends received.
37  These 
changes produce a net $79.2 billion increase in taxable income, relative to current law. 
 
Next, we replaced depletion, depreciation, and amortization deductions with a deduction 
for investment expenditures.  Under the R-base tax, when used capital is sold from one 
firm to another, the purchasing firm would deduct the purchase cost of the acquired 
                                                           
36 U.S. Department of Treasury (1998). 
37 Under the R-base tax, either dividend income is tax-exempt, or it is taxable and the company paying the 
dividend gets to deduct the payment.  We adopted the first approach.  Because our simulation did not 
change the tax treatment of foreign dividends received, we did not exclude those from the R-base.  In the 
absence of complete information about the portion of the dividends received deduction that was generated 
by domestic dividends, we assumed that, on average, domestic dividends qualified for the 80 percent 
deduction.     40
capital, and the selling firm would be taxed on the entire proceeds from the sale.  As long 
as both firms faced the same tax rate, the net tax effects would exactly offset.  Therefore, 
R-base taxable income can be measured either by deducting expenditures on new capital 
and exempting all capital and noncapital gains or by deducting all investment 
expenditures, but adding the entire proceeds from the sale of used assets into the tax base.  
We adopted the first approach. 
 
Our measure of new investment expenditures was based on the figure for capital 
expenditures for new structures and equipment made by all businesses in 1995, reported 
in the U.S. Bureau of Commerce publication, Annual Capital Expenditures: 1995.
38  
Because we were estimating the change in the tax base for nonfinancial C-corporations, 
and the Bureau of Commerce measure included all nonfarm businesses, we made several 
adjustments to the Bureau of Commerce data.  First, we subtracted the Bureau of 
Commerce’s figure for investment by financial businesses from their total for all 
businesses.  Next, we added to the total a U.S. Department of Agriculture estimate of 
investment in new plant and equipment made by agricultural businesses.
39  We then 
allocated total capital expenditures made by nonfinancial businesses among the four 
organizational forms (C-corporations, Subchapter S corporations, partnerships, and sole 
proprietorships) in proportion to each form’s share of total depreciation deductions, as 
reported in Internal Revenue Service publications.
40   
 
Our final step in estimating the difference between the R-base and current tax base dealt 
with the treatment of inventories.  Under the R-base tax, expenditures on inventories 
would be deductible, but under the existing tax, some valuation of withdrawals from 
inventories is deductible.  These two differ on average because withdrawals from 
inventory are priced using older prices, and because of any growth in the size of 
inventories, due to purchases exceeding withdrawals.  The difference between 
expenditures on inventories and accounting withdrawals in a year equals the change in 
the inventory balance sheet during that year.  We therefore reduced taxable income by the 
difference between the balance sheet inventory in 1994 and 1995. 
  
 
Simulating a labor income tax 
 
Calculating a labor income tax base: 
Under the simulated labor income tax, income from interest, dividends, and capital gains 
would be tax exempt, interest deductions would be disallowed, and noncorporate 
business owners would be taxed on their share of the business’ R-base taxable income.  
                                                           
38 U.S. Department of Commerce (April 1997).  Gordon and Slemrod (1987) obtained their investment 
figures from the “New Plant and Equipment Expenditures” data series appearing in the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) publication, Survey of Current Business.  In 1988, responsibility for producing 
investment figures was transferred from BEA to the Bureau of the Census, and the “New Plant and 
Equipment” series was replaced with the “Annual Capital Expenditures Survey.” 
39 U.S. Department of Agriculture (September 21, 2001).  To estimate farm purchases of new equipment 
and structures, we reduced by half the published figure of $13.8 billion spent on new and used capital, as 
recommended by Economic Research Service staff. 
40 U.S. Department of Treasury (1997, 1998a, 1998b).   41
In other words, under the labor income tax, individuals would be taxed on the 
compensation they receive from their employers plus the portion their self-employment 
income that is a return to labor. 
 
Using individual tax return data from SOI’s “1995 Public Use File,” we first subtracted 
Schedule B taxable interest income from, and added Schedule A interest deductions to, 
the tax base.  Next, we subtracted from taxable income all “other capital income,” which 
included dividends, net capital gains, and the capital portion of noncorporate business 
income—that portion that would have been tax-exempt under a R-base tax. 
 
Estimating R-base taxable income from noncorporate businesses:  
Individual income tax returns do not include enough detail about the taxpayer’s 
noncorporate business income to estimate the portion of that income that would have 
been taxable under a R-base tax.  We, therefore, estimated those amounts from aggregate 
tax return data for partnerships, Subchapter S corporations, and sole proprietorships.
41  
Using the same procedure as for C-corporations, we zeroed out net interest 
income/payments, dividend income, and capital gains, and replaced depreciation, 
amortization, and depletion deductions with estimates for new investment expenditures.  
Because partnerships report some net income and losses from other partnerships and 
fiduciaries, we made an additional correction to taxable income for partnerships.  We 
assumed that the ratio of R-base taxable income to net income was the same for income 
from other partnerships as for ordinary partnership income, and we solved algebraically 
for the portion of this income that would taxable under the R-base tax.  Next, we 
calculated the ratio of R-base taxable income to current law net income for each type of 
organizational form, and for profit and loss firms separately.  Those ratios appear below.   
 





(Schedule C)  Farm (Schedule F) 
Net  income  78%  78% 94% 87%  87% 
Net  loss  59%  59% 92% 89%  89% 
 
Returning to the 1995 Public Use File, we applied these ratios to the income from 
noncorporate business reported on individual tax returns to obtain the estimated portion 
of noncorporate business income to be taxed under the R-base tax.  The remainder of 
noncorporate business income was then included in “other capital income” and was 
subtracted from the individual income tax base.  For example, if a taxpayer reported net 
partnership income, we estimated that 78 percent of that income was labor income and 
included it in R-base taxable income.  The remaining 22 percent was included in “other 
capital income” and was exempted from R-base taxable income.  The same procedure, 
with different percentages, was applied to those tax returns that reported noncorporate 
business losses.  Consequently, a substantial portion of business losses were included in 
our estimate of labor income. 
 
 
                                                           
41 U.S. Department of Treasury (1997, 1998a, 1998b). 
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Calculating tax on the labor income base: 
To estimate the amount of individual tax liability that would have been generated by a 
labor income tax, we developed a microsimulation computer program.  Using individual 
tax return data from the 1995 Public Use File as input, the program calculated income tax 
liability for each taxpayer as if the base had been  labor income, as defined above, with 
all tax parameters (rates, standard deductions, exempt amounts, phaseout levels, etc.) held 
at their 1995 levels.  We held all itemized deductions (except interest paid) the same, 
though if the simulation for a taxpayer yielded an itemized deduction amount that was 
below the taxpayer’s standard deduction, we applied the standard deduction in the 
taxpayer’s tax calculation 